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Abstract—Compound MIMO wiretap channel with double sided
uncertainty is considered under channel mean information model.
In mean information model, channel variations are centered around
its mean value which is fed back to the transmitter. We show that
the worst case main channel is anti-parallel to the channel mean
information resulting in an overall unit rank channel. Further, the
worst eavesdropper channel is shown to be isotropic around its
mean information. Accordingly, we provide the capacity achieving
beamforming direction. We show that the saddle point property
holds under mean information model, and thus, compound secrecy
capacity equals to the worst case capacity over the class of
uncertainty. Moreover, capacity achieving beamforming direction is
found to require matrix inversion, thus, we derive the null steering
(NS) beamforming as an alternative suboptimal solution that does
not require matrix inversion. NS beamformer is in the direction
orthogonal to the eavesdropper mean channel that maintains the
maximum possible gain in mean main channel direction. Extensive
computer simulation reveals that NS performs very close to the
optimal solution. It also verifies that, NS beamforming outperforms
both maximum ratio transmission (MRT) and zero forcing (ZF)
beamforming approaches over the entire SNR range. Finally, An
equivalence relation with MIMO wiretap channel in Rician fading
environment is established.
Index Terms—MIMO Wiretap Channel, Compound Wiretap
Channel, Mean Channel Information, Saddle point, Worst Case
Capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
A key consideration in determining the secrecy capacity of the
MIMO wiretap channel is the amount of information available
at the transmitter, not only about the eavesdropper channel, but
also about the main channel. In principle, assuming perfect
knowledge about the main channel, either full eavesdropper’s
channel state information (CSI) or, at least, its distribution are
required to determine the secrecy capacity. The secrecy capacity
of the general MIMO wiretap channel has been studied in [1]–[3]
assuming perfect knowledge of both channels.
In practical scenarios, having even partial knowledge on the
eavesdropper channel is typically not possible, especially, when
dealing with strictly passive eavesdroppers. Further, in fast fading
channel, it may also be unreasonable to have perfect main
CSI at the transmitter. Compound wiretap channel [4], [5] is
a model that tackle these limitations in which CSI is known
only to belong to a certain class of uncertainty. This assumption
can be used to model eavesdropper only CSI [6] (single sided
uncertainty) or both main and eavesdropper channels (double
sided uncertainty) [7], [8]. Depending on the considered class
of uncertainty, the secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap
channel can be characterized.
Classes of uncertainity in the compound wiretap channel can
be characterized in two different categories as it pertains to the
set that the main and/or eavesdropper channels belong to: 1)
Finite state channels 2) Continous set. The discrete memoryless
compound wiretap channel with countably finite uncertainty set
was studied in [6], [9]. Meanwhile, the corresponding compound
Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with countably finite uncer-
tainty set is analyzed in [6]. In both cases, the secrecy capacity
is established only for the degraded case (i.e. main channel
is stronger in all spatial directions). Meanwhile, the secrecy
capacity itself remains unknown for the general indefinite case
(i.e. main channel is stronger in subset of the available spatial
directions). A closed form solution was obtained either in case
of an isotropic eavesdropper [8] or the degraded case in the high
SNR regime [10]. Although the optimal signaling scheme for
the non-isotropic non-degraded case still not known to date in
general, necessary conditions for optimality were derived in [10]
and [11] for the deterministic known channel case. Recently in
[8], the compound Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel was studied
under spectral norm constraint (maximum channel gain) and rank
constraint for both single and double sided classes of uncertainty
without the degradedness assumption.
In [8] (Theorem 3) it was shown that, the secrecy capacity of
the compound MIMO wiretap channel is upper bounded by the
worst case capacity over the considered class of uncertainty. The
term worst case capacity is established by optimizing the input
signal covariance for all possible main and eavesdropper channel,
then, taking the minimum over all main and eavesdropper chan-
nels over the considered class of uncertainty. Moreover, it was
also shown that, the compound secrecy capacity is lower bounded
by the capacity of the worst possible main and eavesdropper
channels. Here, the saddle point needs to be considered, i.e.
max min = min max, where the max is taken over non-negative
definite input covariance matrices subject to an average power
constraint and the min is taken over the classes of channel
uncertainty. If the saddle point property holds, the compound
capacity is fully characterized and is known to match the worst
case one.
In this paper, we consider the class of channels with double
sided uncertainty under channel mean information model. In
mean information model, channel is centered around a mean
value which is fed back to the transmitter. An example for the
mean information model is the channel with a strong Line-of-
Sight (LOS) component, the gain of which is known at the
transmitter. While it is unlikely to expect the eavesdropper to
share its CSI (even its mean channel) in some scenarios, a
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secure communication system may be designed in a way that
puts physical restrictions on the locations of possible attacker.
These physical restrictions can be informative to the transmitter
and may enable to achieve better secrecy rates by designing its
signaling scheme accordingly. We first establish the worst case
secrecy capacity of the compound MIMO wiretap channel under
mean information model, then, we show that the saddle point
property holds. We show that, the worst case main channel is
anti-parallel to the channel mean information resulting in an
overall unit rank channel. Further, the worst eavesdropper drop-
per channel is shown to be isotropic around its mean information.
Accordingly, generalized eigenvector beamforming is known to
be the optimal signaling strategy [10] [12]. We show that the
saddle point property holds under mean information model,
and thus, compound secrecy capacity equals to the worst case
capacity over the class of uncertainty. Further, as the generalized
eigenvector solution requires matrix inversion, we introduce
null steering (NS) beamforming, that is, transmission in the
direction orthogonal to the eavesdropper mean channel direction
maintaining the maximum possible gain in mean main chan-
nel direction, as an alternative suboptimal solution. Extensive
computer simulation reveals that NS performs extremely close
to the optimal solution. It also verifies that, NS beamforming
outperforms both maximum ratio transmission (MRT) and zero
forcing (ZF) beamforming approaches over the entire SNR range.
Finally, An equivalence relation with MIMO wiretap channel in
Rician fading environment is established.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Notations
In the rest of this paper we use boldface uppercase letters for
random matrices, uppercase letters for their realizations, bold
face lowercase letters for random vectors and lowercase letters
for its realizations. Meanwhile, (.)† denotes conjugate transpose,
IN denotes identity matrix of size N , det(.) denotes matrix
determinant operator and 1m×n denotes a m × n matrix of all
1’s.
B. System Model
We consider the MIMO wiretap channel scenario in which
a transmitter A with Na > 1 antennas amounts to transmit a
confidential message massage to a receiver, B, having Nb > 1
antennas over an unsecure channel in the presence of a passive
adversary, E , equipped with Ne > 1 antennas. The discrete
baseband equivalent channels for the signal received by each of
the legitimate destination, y, and the adversary, z, are as follows:
y = Hbx + nb, z = Hex + ne, (1)
where x ∈ CNa×1 is the transmitted signal vector constrained
by an average power constraint E[tr(xx†)] ≤ P . Also, Hb ∈
CNb×Na and He ∈ CNe×Na are the channel coefficients matrices
between message source, destination and adversary respectively.
Finally, nb ∈ CNb×1 and ne ∈ CNe×1 are independent zero
mean normalized to unit variance circular symmetric complex
random vectors for both destination and adversary channels
respectively, where, nb ∼ CN (0, INb) and ne ∼ CN (0, INe).
C. Problem Statement
In this paper, we consider the case where the transmitter does
not know the exact realizations of both Hb and He. Rather, it
only knows that they both belong to a known compact (closed
and bounded) uncertainty sets. Under the considered channel
mean feedback model, we define channel uncertainty sets as
follows:
Sb = {Hb : Hb = Hµb + ∆Hb, |∆Hb|2 ≤ b,
Hµb = λ
1/2
µb vbu
†
b}, (2)
Se = {He : He = Hµe + ∆He, |∆He|2 ≤ e,
Hµe = λ
1/2
µe veu
†
e, ue ∈ U}, (3)
where, Hµ◦ is the channel mean information which is assumed
to be of unit rank and v◦ ∈ CN◦×1, u◦ ∈ CNa×1. We assume
that the transmitter knows ub, meanwhile, it knows only that
ue ∈ U where U is the set of uncertainty about the eavesdropper
mean information. In the extreme case when ue is know exactly
at the transmitter, we simply write U = {ue}.
Further, ∆H◦ is the channel uncertain part which is assumed
to satisfy the bounded spectral norm condition |∆H◦|2 ≤ ◦.
In the compound wiretap channel, channels realizations are
assumed to be fixed over the entire transmission duration. There-
fore, ∆H◦ is considered fixed once it has been realized. This
model is the scenario in which the eavesdropper can approach
the transmitter up to a certain distance and from limited range
of directions, see Fig. (1). First, let us define
Fig. 1. Wiretap channel with physically constrained eavesdropper
C(Wb,We,Q) = log
det(INa + WbQ)
det(INa + WeQ)
, (4)
where W◦ , H†◦H◦, ◦ ∈ {e, b} is the channel Gram matrix and
Q = E
[
xx†
]
is the input signal covariance matrix. The capacity
of the worst case main and eavesdropper channels can be defined
as follows:
Cw = min
Wb:Hb∈Sb
We:He∈Se
max
Q0
tr(Q)≤P
C(Wb,We,Q). (5)
The following lower bound on the compound secrecy capacity
was established in [8]:
Cl = max
Q0
tr(Q)≤P
min
Wb:Hb∈Sb
We:He∈Se
C(Wb,We,Q). (6)
thus, the following bounds on the compound capacity holds [8]:
Cl ≤ Cc ≤ Cw (7)
The problem under consideration is first to evaluate the lower
bound on the compound capacity over the uncertainty sets by
solving (6). To solve (6) we need to identify the worst case
main and eavesdropper channels (i.e. main and eavesdropper
channel realizations that minimize the lower bound), and then,
determining the optimal signaling scheme accordingly. Further,
we need to check whether the saddle point property, in the form
max min = min max, for the considered class of channels.
III. COMPOUND SECRECY CAPACITY WITH KNOWN
EAVESDROPPER MEAN INFORMATION
In this section we characterize the secrecy capacity of the con-
sidered compound wiretap channel when the mean information
of the eavesdropper, ue, is known exactly at the transmitter, i.e.,
U = {ue}. To proceed, we first need to identify the worst main
channel Gram matrix, Wbw which is evaluated in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. For the considered compound wiretap channel,
for any non negative definite matrix Q and any We such that
He ∈ Se we have
C(Wb,We,Q) ≥ C(Wbw,We,Q) (8)
where Wbw = (λ
1/2
µb −b)2+ubu†b is the worst main channel Gram
matrix where (x)+ = max(0, x).
Proof. The proof is give in Appendix A. 
The result of Proposition 1 can interpreted as follows, the
worst main channel is the channel that has lost all, but one,
of its degrees of freedom, meanwhile, the only left degree of
freedom happens with its maximum possible strength in the
direction that is anti-parallel to the mean channel. An obvious
direct consequence of Proposition 1 is that the optimal input
covariance, Q∗, has to be of unit rank. That is because Wbw
is shown to be of unit rank. Therefore, we conclude that
beamforming is the optimal transmit strategy for the considered
compound wiretap channel. Thus, we can restrict our analysis to
a unit rank Q. Next, we need to identify the worst eavesdropper
Gram matrix.
Proposition 2. For the considered compound wiretap channel,
for any unit rank matrix Q with λ(Q) ≤ P , we have
C(Wbw,We,Q) ≥ C(Wbw,Wew,Q) (9)
where Wew = (λµe + 2λ
1/2
µe e)ueu
†
e + 
2
eI is the worst eaves-
dropper channel Gram matrix.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B. 
The statement of proposition 2 states that the worst eavesdrop-
per channel is isotropic around its mean channel. This means
that, the worst eavesdropper dropper channel happens with its
maximum strength in the direction parallel to its mean channel.
The main result of this paper is given in the following theorem.
We give the compound secrecy capacity of the considered class
of channel and the capacity achieving input signal covariance
Q∗.
Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity for the compound wiretap
channel defined in (2) and (3) is equal to the worst case capacity,
the saddle point property holds
C∗c = max
Q0
tr(Q)≤P
min
Wb:Hb∈Sb
We:He∈Se
C(Wb,We,Q)
= min
Wb:Hb∈Sb
We:He∈Se
max
Q0
tr(Q)≤P
C(Wb,We,Q)
= C(Wbw,Wew,Q
∗) = Cw (10)
where Wbw and Wew are as given in Propositions 1 and 2
respectively. Moreover, beamforming is the optimal signaling
strategy:
Q∗ = Pq∗q†∗, (11)
where q∗ is the eigenvector associated with the maximum eigen-
value of (INa + PWew)−1(INa + PWbw).
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix C. 
Theorem 1 proves that the saddle point property holds for the
class of channels described in (2) and (3), and thus, the secrecy
capacity of the compound wiretap channel is equal to the worst
case capacity. Further, since the worst case main channel is of
unit rank, accordingly, generalized eigenvector beamforming is
known to be the optimal signaling strategy [10] [12].
A. Null Steering Beamforming as an Alternative Solution
As can be seen from Theorem 1, the generalized eigenvector
solution requires matrix inversion which may require a consider-
ably high computational complexity especially when the number
of transmitting antennas gets large. Therefore, we introduce the
null steering (NS) beamforming [13] as an alternative suboptimal
solution. In our case, the NS beamforming matrix is given as
follows:
Qns = Pqnsq
†
ns, qns =
[
I− ueu†e
]
ub∥∥∥[I− ueu†e]ub∥∥∥ . (12)
NS beamformer can recognized as the projection of ub onto the
null space of uw. In particular, qns maximizes the gain in the
direction ub while creating a null notch in the direction ue. Thus,
it can understood as the transmission in the direction orthogonal
to the eavesdropper mean channel direction maintaining the
maximum possible gain in mean main channel direction. We give
justifications for the choice of NS beamforming as a candidate
suboptimal solution for our problem in Appendix E. Extensive
computer simulation provided in section V-C reveals that NS
performs extremely close to the optimal solution, yet, with no
need for matrix inversion.
IV. COMPOUND SECRECY CAPACITY WITH EAVESDROPPER
MEAN UNCERTAINTY
Unlike the previous section where ue is assumed to be known
at the transmitter, in this section we characterize the secrecy
capacity of the considered compound wiretap channel when the
eavesdropper mean direction, ue, is known only to belong to
the set U . A key step toward the characterization of the secrecy
capacity is to find the worst eavesdropper channel Gram matrix
Wew with that assumption. We give Wew in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. For the considered compound wiretap channel
with ue ∈ U , for all Wb ∈ S1 and any non negative definite
matrix Q we have
C(Wb,We,Q) ≥ C(Wb,Wew,Q) (13)
where Wew = (λµe + 2λ
1/2
µe e)u∗u
†
∗ + 2eI is the worst eaves-
dropper channel Gram matrix where:
u∗ = arg max
u∈U
u†bu, (14)
Proof. The proof is given in appendix D. 
Observe that, the assumption that ue ∈ U does not affect
Wbw, thus, the optimal covariance is again of unit rank as
in the case U = {ue}. Therefore, beamforming is still the
optimal transmit strategy under the assumption ue ∈ U . Again,
transmission in the direction of the eigenvector of (INa +
PWew)
−1(INa +PWbw) is the optimal solution where Wew as
given in proposition 3. We give the optimal Q∗ in the following
corollary as a direct consequence of Theorem 1
Corollary 1. The saddle point property (10) holds for the con-
sidered compound wiretap channel with ue ∈ U . Moreover, the
optimal signaling scheme is zero mean Gaussian with covariance
matrix given by
Q∗ = Pq∗q†∗, (15)
where q∗ is the eigenvector associated with the maximum eigen-
value of (INa + PWew)−1(INa + PWbw), where Wbw and
Wew are as given in propositions 1 and 3, respectively.
Proof. Follows immediately by Theorem 1 while realizing that
the worst eavesdropper mean channel is in the direction u∗. 
Corollary 1 extends Theorem 1 to the case of uncertainty
about the eavesdropper mean channel direction. We can conclude
that, since the transmitter does not know the eavesdropper mean
channel, it design its signal assuming the worst eavesdropper
mean channel. Again, we note that, NS beamforming still can
be introduced as an alternative solution against an eavesdropper
with mean direction uncertainty. For this particular scenario, qns
takes the same form as in (12), yet, in the direction u∗ instead
of ue.
V. APPLICATION TO RICIAN FADING MIMO WIRETAP
CHANNEL
In this section we consider a special class of MIMO wiretap
channels which is well adopted to the class of compound wiretap
channel considered in this paper. We study the Rician fading
MIMO wiretap channel. In a Rician fading environment, the
deterministic line of sight (LOS) component causes the channel
variations to be centered around a mean matrix. This mean
matrix is usually of unit rank whose gain depends mainly on
the distance between transmitter and receiver, array configuration
and respective array orientation. In the next section we give the
Rician fading MIMO channel model, and then, in section V-B
we describe the relation between Rician MIMO wiretap channel
and the compound wiretap channel described in (2) and (3).
A. Rician Fading MIMO Channel Model
Wireless MIMO channel with dominant LOS component is
best described by the Rician fading model. In Rician fading
model, the received signal can be decomposed into two compo-
nents; one is the specular component originated from the LOS
path and the other is the diffuse non-line of sight component
(NLOS) component. Following, we give the mathematical model
for the considered Rician MIMO wiretap channel with the
subscript ◦ ∈ {b, e} denotes the legitimate and eavesdropper
channels respectively.
H◦ = Hlos◦ + H
nlos
◦ , (16)
where Hlos◦ and H
nlos
◦ represents the LOS and NLOS compo-
nents respectively and
Hlos◦ =
√
γ2◦k◦
1 + k◦
Ψ◦, Hnlos◦ =
√
γ2◦
1 + k◦
Hˆ◦, (17)
where γ◦ quantifies the channel strength for both receiver
and eavesdropper, k◦ is the Rician factor that facilitates the
contribution of the LOS component to the received signal,
Ψ◦ = a(θ◦)a†(φ◦), a(θ◦) and a(φ◦) are the antenna array
spatial signatures (steering vectors) at receiver (eavesdropper)
and transmitter respectively, θ◦ and φ◦ are the angle of arrival
(AoA) and angle of departure (AoD) of the transmitted signal
respectively. Note that, AoD, φ, represents the azimuth angle
of the receiver (eavesdropper) with respect to the transmitter
antenna array. Meanwhile, Hˆ◦ represents the channel coefficients
matrix for the NLOS signal component.
B. Relation to the Compound Wiretap Channel
In the previous section we gave the mathematical description
of the Rician fading MIMO wiretap channel. In this section we
highlight the equivalence relation between this class of MIMO
wiretap channel and the compound wiretap channel studied in
this paper. Recalling the definition of the compound wiretap
channel given in (2) and (3), it is straight forward to see that
the following analogies hold:
Hµ◦ ⇔ Hlos◦ , λµ◦ ⇔
NaN◦γ2◦k◦
1 + k◦
,
v◦ ⇔ a(θ◦), u◦ ⇔ a(φ◦),
∆H◦ ⇔ Hnlos◦ , 2◦ ⇔
N◦γ2◦
1 + k◦
. (18)
Observe that in the settings of Rician fading MIMO wire-
tap channel, eavesdropper eigen direction, ue, corresponds to
the physical direction (in azimuth plane) of the eavesdropper.
Therefore, the assumptions that ue is known at the transmitter
corresponds to the scenario in which the transmitter has a prior
knowledge about the eavesdropper azimuth direction. Whereas,
the assumption that ue ∈ U corresponds to the scenario in which
the transmitter does not know exactly the azimuth direction of
the eavesdropper, meanwhile, it knows that the eavesdropper, if
any, has a restricted access to the communication area. That is,
it can only approach the transmitter up to a certain distance and
the receiver up to a certain azimuth direction.
C. Numerical results
For the sake of numerical evaluation, we use the established
equivalence relation between the considered compound wiretap
channel and the MIMO channel with Rician fading. We compare
the performance of the optimal solution to our proposed NS
beamforming solution. Given the azimuth direction of both
eavesdropper and legitimate receiver, another two possible trans-
mission schemes may come to mind. First, beamforming toward
the intended receiver which is well known as MRT. Second,
creating a deep null notch in the direction of the eavesdropper
which is well known as ZF. To evaluate the value of the mean
information, we provide numerical simulation for an eavesdrop-
per having the same parameters as of the main receiver, i.e.
Na = Nb = Ne = 4 and γb = γe = 1, for the same Rician k
factor, and thus, we have b = e and λµb = λµe. We assume
uniform linear array configuration at all nodes with antenna
spacing of half wavelength. Whereas, we assume the receiver and
eavesdropper not to share the same azimuth direction, φb = 25◦
and φe = 60◦. As can be seen in Fig. (2), we compare the
achievable secrecy rate for the NS, MRT and ZF beamforming
approaches against the optimal solution for different values of
Rician k factor. Simulation results shows that NS beamforming
performs extremely close to optimal and outperforms both MRT
and ZF over the entire SNR range. Although It may be seen
that NS performance matches the optimal solution, we provide
a zoom in picture at the upper left corner of Fig. (2) to show
that the acheivable rate by NS beamforming is slightly below the
secrecy capacity of the channel. It is observed that it maintains
a small gap to capacity in order of 10−4 over the entire SNR
range for all values of k.
Fig. 2. Secrecy capacity of Rician compound wiretap channel with mean
feedback. NS beamforming performs extremely close to optimal and outperforms
both MRT and ZF approaches over the entire SNR range for different values of
Rician k factor. Legitimate transmitter is located at 25◦, eavesdropper is at 60◦.
Number of antennas is 4 for all entities.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Compound MIMO wiretap channel with double sided uncer-
tainty is considered under channel mean information model. The
worst case main channel is shown to be anti-parallel to the chan-
nel mean information resulting in an overall unit rank channel.
Further, the worst eavesdropper dropper channel is shown to be
isotropic around its mean information. Accordingly, generalized
eigenvector beamforming is shown to be the optimal signaling
strategy. The saddle point property is shown to hold under mean
information model, and thus, compound secrecy capacity equals
to the worst case capacity over the class of uncertainty. Further,
as the generalized eigenvector solution requires matrix inversion,
we introduced NS beamforming, that is, transmission in the
direction orthogonal to the eavesdropper mean channel direction
maintaining the maximum possible gain in mean main chan-
nel direction, as an alternative suboptimal solution. Extensive
computer simulation revealed that NS performs extremely close
to the optimal solution. It also verified the superiority of NS
beamforming to both MRT and ZF approaches over the entire
SNR range.
It is worth noting that, the results for the compound wiretap
channel are too conservative in general and, consequently, so is
the result of this paper. That is due to the assumption that channel
realizations remain constant over the entire transmission duration
leading us to the worst case optimization. While this assumption
simplifies the mathematical analysis, it does not usually hold in
practice. More interesting scenario is to consider the compound
wiretap channel with channel realizations allowed to change,
possibly random, during transmission duration.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We observe that
C(Wb,We,Q) = log
det(INa + WbQ)
det(INa + WeQ)
(a)
=
Na∑
i=1
log(1 + λi(WbQ))
− log det(INa + WeQ)
(b)
=
Na∑
i=1
log(1 + σ2i ((Hµb + ∆Hb)Q
1/2))
− log det(INa + WeQ)
(c)
≥ log(1 + (λ1/2µb − b)2+λ1(Q))
− log det(INa + WeQ)
(d)
= C(Wbw,We,Q) (19)
where (a) follows from determinant properties and (b) follows
by recognizing that λi(WbQ) = σ2i ((Hµb + ∆Hb)Q
1/2) where
σi(A) is the ith singular value of A. Meanwhile, (c) follows
from the singular value inequality in Lemma 7 in [8], that is,
σ2i ((Hµb + ∆Hb)Q
1/2) ≥ (σi(Hµb) − σ1(∆Hb))+λi(Q) and
removed the summation due to the fact that σ1(Hµb) = λ
1/2
µb
and σi(Hµb) = 0 ∀i > 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
It can be seen that
C(Wbw,We,Q)
(a)
= log
det(INa + (λ
1/2
µb − b)2+ubu†bQ)
det(INa + WeQ)
(b)
= log
1 + λ((λ
1/2
µb − b)2+ubu†bQ)
1 + σ2((Hµe + ∆He)Q1/2)
(c)
= log
1 + λ((λ
1/2
µb − b)2+ubu†bQ)
1 + σ2(HµeQ1/2 + ∆HeQ1/2)
(d)
≥ log 1 + λ((λ
1/2
µb − b)2+ubu†bQ)
1 + (σ(HµeQ1/2) + σ(∆HeQ1/2))2
(20)
where (a) follows by direct substitution in (4) with Wbw
given in proposition 1, (b) follows since Q is of unit rank
and that λ(WbQ) = σ2((Hµb + ∆Hb)Q1/2) and (c) is
straightforward. Meanwhile, the upper bound in (d) follows
since σ(A + B) ≤ σ(A) + σ(B) for unit rank matrices A
and B where the inequality holds with equality when A and
B have the same singular vectors. Therefore, the inequality
in (d) established with equality if Hµe and ∆He have the
same singular vectors. Let us write Hµe = V ΣµeU† where
the first columns of V and U are ve and ue respectively, and
Σµe = diag{λ1/2µe , 0, .., 0}. Hence to establish (d) with equality,
∆He need to have V and U as its right and singular vectors
respectively. Consequently, we can write He = V ΣeU†, and
hence, We = UΣ2eU
†. But we have that Σµe  eI, accordingly,
Σe  Σew where Σew = diag{λ1/2µe + e, e, ..., e}. Noting that
the function log det(I + WQ) is monotonically increasing in
W, we conclude that Wew = UΣ2ewU
†. However, we can write
Wew as (λµe + 2λ
1/2
µe e)ueu
†
e + 
2
eI as required.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To establish the saddle point property, we give a proof similar
to the one given in Theorem 6 in [8] while keeping in mind
the difference between the compound wiretap channel defined
there with the one defined in (2) and (3). Let Q∗ be the optimal
solution for the left hand side max-min problem, we observe
that, to show the saddle point property in (10) is equivalent to
show that [14]:
C(Wbw,Wew,Q)
(a)
≤ C(Wbw,Wew,Q∗)
(b)
≤ C(Wb,We,Q∗), (21)
where Wew and Wbw are as given in propositions 2 and 1
respectively. Note that (a) follows since Q∗ is optimal for Wb =
Wbw and We = Wew. Now we write:
C(Wbw,Wew,Q
∗)
(a)
= log(1 + σ2i ((λ
1/2
µb − b)2+ubu†bQ∗1/2))
− log det(I + WewQ∗)
(b)
≤
Na∑
i=1
log(1 + σ2i ((Hµb + ∆Hb)Q
∗1/2))
− log det(I + WewQ∗)
(c)
= C(Wb,Wew,Q
∗)
(d)
≤ C(Wb,We,Q∗) (22)
where (a) follows by direct substitution by Wbw, meanwhile, (b)
and (c) follow from (8) and we used (9) to write (d). Since the
difference channel is, at most, of unit rank, then, beamforming
toward the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of
(INa+PWew)
−1(INa+PWbw) follows by corollary 1 in [10]
and Theorem 6 in [12].
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Observe that H†µeHµe = λµeuu
† for some u ∈ U . Thus, the
result of proposition 3 can be established in a fashion similar to
the proof of proposition 2, however, by realizing that
min
We:He∈Se
C(Wbw,We(u),Q) =
min
u∈U
C(Wbw, (λµe + 2λ
1/2
µe e)uu
† + 2eI,Q).
(23)
Thus, taking the minimum of (20) over u and dropping the
constraint u ∈ U , the minimum is attained when u = ub.
Meanwhile, with the constraint into action, the minimum is
attained at u∗ ∈ U which has the minimum distance to ub.
Equivalently,
u∗ = arg min
u∈U
‖ub − u‖
= arg max
u∈U
u†bu (24)
which agree with (14).
APPENDIX E
JUSTIFICATION FOR NS BEAMFORMING
To understand the motivation behind introducing NS beam-
forming as an alternative solution, we write Q = Pqq†. Now, it
can be seen that:
C∗c = max
Q0
tr(Q)≤P
C(Wbw,Wew,Q)
(a)
= max
Q0
tr(Q)≤P
log
det(I + WbwQ)
det(I + WewQ)
(b)
= max
Q0
tr(Q)≤P
log
det(I + (λ
1/2
µb − b)2+ubu†bQ)
det(I + (λµe + 2λ
1/2
µe e)ueu
†
e + 2eI)Q)
(c)
= max
q
‖q‖=1
log
det(I + P (λ
1/2
µb − b)2+ubu†bqq†)
det(I + P ((λµe + 2λ
1/2
µe e)ueu
†
eqq† + 2eqq†))
(d)
= max
q
‖q‖=1
log
1 + P (λ
1/2
µb − b)2+u†bq
1 + P ((λµe + 2λ
1/2
µe e)u
†
eq + 2e))
(25)
where (a) follows by direct substitution with Wbw and Wew in
(4), (b) follows by substituting the values of Wbw and Wew.
Meanwhile, in (c) we used that Q is of unit rank and thus
it has only one eigenvalue equals to P and its corresponding
eigenvector q, also, we have removed the power constraint by
introducing the constraint ‖q‖ = 1. Since both of the numerator
and the denominator are of unit rank, d follows from (c) by
substituting the only eigenvalue of both of them. Now observe
that, the choice of q does not affect the eigenvalue of the
matrix 2eqq
†, rather, it do affect the eigenvalues of the other
matrices. Clearly our objective is to find q that simultaneously
maximizes the numerator and minimizes (optimally, nulling out)
the denominator in (25(d)). The optimal q∗ that maximizes Cc
is given by Theorem 1. However, we note that qns in (12) is the
optimal solution to the following optimization problem
max
q
‖q‖=1
< q†, ub >
Subject to < q†, ue >= 0, (26)
i.e., beamforming in the direction qns maximizes the gain in the
direction ub while creating a null notch in the direction ue.
